The old regime and the revolution 旧制度与大革命
Why some think China is approaching a political tipping point 为什么有些人认为中国已经到了倾覆的边缘？
Mar 16th 2013 |From the print edition
FOR some of China’s more than 500m internet users the big news story of the week has not been the long-scheduled one that their country has a new president, Xi Jinping, who already has more important jobs running the Communist Party and chairing its military commiion.Rather it was the unscheduled, unwelcome and unexplained arrival down a river into Shanghai of the putrescent carcaes of thousands of dead pigs, apparently dumped there by farmers upstream.The latest in an endle series of public-health, pollution and corruption scandals, it is hard to think of a more potent (and disgusting) symbol of the view, common among internet users, that, for all its astonishing economic advance, there is something rotten in the state of China, and that change will have to come.
对中国5亿多网民中的一些人来说，本周的大新闻不是他们的国家有了个新的主席。这早是预料之中的事情。在习近平担任国家主席前，他已经担任更为重要的职务—党总书记和军委主席。对这些网民来说，更大的新闻是数千头死猪腐烂的尸体，沿江而下，毫无征兆和解释的出现在上海。很明显，这些不速之客是被上游的农户丢弃的。此次事件是一连串没完没了的公共卫生、污染和腐败丑闻中的最新一桩。很难想出还有更有力的证据表明，尽管中国取得了让人惊讶的经济成就，但是在中国有些东西已经开始腐烂，改变必将到来。该观点在网民中非常普遍。
Many think it will.According to Andrew Nathan, an American scholar, “the consensus is stronger than at any time since the 1989 Tiananmen crisis that the resilience of the authoritarian regime in…China is approaching its limits.” Mr Nathan, who a decade ago coined the term “authoritarian resilience” to describe the Chinese Communist Party’s ability to adapt and survive, was contributing, in the Journal of Democracy, an American academic quarterly, to a collection of eays with the titillating title: “China at the tipping point?” Ever since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, foreigners have been predicting the demise of one-party rule.Surely a political system designed for a centrally planned economy with virtually no private sector cannot indefinitely survive more or le intact in the vibrant, open new China.In 1989 China went to the brink of revolution.When reform came to the Soviet Union and its satellites, for a while China seemed like the next domino, waiting to topple.
很多人认为改变会到来。美国学者Andrew Nathan认为，“中国独裁政权的韧性已经接近了它的极限，这种共识比1989年的**危机以来的任何时候都更强烈。”十年前创造了“独裁韧性”来描绘中国共产党适应和生存下来能力的Nathan先生，在美国学术季刊《民主杂志》上发表了一系列文章。文章的标题让人感到刺激，“即将倾覆的中国”。自1976年毛泽东过世之后，国外人士一直在预计一党统治的死亡。在开放和充满活力的新中国，一个为实际上没有私营部门的中央计划经济设计的政治体系，肯定不能无限期地几乎毫发无损的生存下来。1989年当变革席卷苏联及其卫星国时，中国走到了革命的边缘，一段时间内中国好像要成为下一块即将倒下的多米乐骨牌。
But the party proved far more durable—and popular—than seemed poible in 1989.And as China’s economy soared and the Western democracies floundered, authoritarianism proved more resilient than ever.With China booming, few tried to emulate the Arab spring of 2011.They were easily dealt with by the pervasive “stability-maintenance” machinery.
但事实证明，在1989看起来可能要倒台的共产党，其实更具有持久性，更得人心。随着中国经济的飞速发展和西方民主国家陷入困境，独裁主义被证明比以往更具有韧性。由于中国经济的繁荣，很少人尝试效仿2011年的阿拉伯之春运动。他们可以轻易地被无孔不入的“维稳”机器处理掉。
No single change explains why China might be nearer to a tipping point now.But the evolution of Chinese society is eroding some of the bases of party rule.Fear may be diminishing.Nearly 500m Chinese are under 25 and have no direct memory of the bloody suppreion of the Tiananmen protests: the government has done its best to keep them in the dark about it.A few public diidents still write open letters and court harament and jail sentences.But millions join in subversive chatter online, mocking the party when not ignoring it.
没有某个变化可以解释为什么中国可能更加接近倾覆的临界点。但是中国社会的不断进步正不断侵蚀着一党统治的基础。恐惧可能正在消失。近5亿中国人的年龄在25岁以下，他们对**的血腥镇压没有直接的印象：政府竭尽所能使他们对此事件一无所知。尽管一些持不同政见人士仍然写公开信，对法院不公正的判决紧咬不放。但是数以百万计的人会选择上网，聊一些颠覆性质的话题，如果不忽视共产党的存在，嘲笑它。
“Ma incidents”—protests and demonstrations—proliferate.Farmers resent land-grabs by greedy local officials.The second generation of workers staffing the world’s workshop in eastern China are more ambitious and le docile than their parents.And the urban middle cla is growing fast.Elsewhere, the emergence of this group has brought down authoritarian regimes, through people-power (in South Korea, for example) or negotiation (Taiwan).And much of China’s middle-cla seems discontented, furious at the corruption and inequality the party has allowed to flourish, and fed up with poison in their food, asphyxiating filth in their air and dead pigs in their water-supply.The internet and mobile telephony provide tools for spreading news and anger nationally.The party has to work hard to make sure that they do not also help unite all these atomised grievances into a concerted movement.It has a lot of hammers and a lot of nails.But it is still hard to pin jelly to the wall.
“群体性事件”——抗议和游行——不断扩散。农民们憎恶贪婪的地方官员无耻地攫取他们的土地。比起他们的父母来说，在中国东部—世界工厂—工作的农民工二代们多了些野心，少了些温顺。同时城市的中产阶级正在快速的成长。在世界其他地方，这一阶级的出现已经通过人民的抗争（例如，在韩国）和谈判（台湾），推翻了独裁政权。而且很多中国中产阶级人士好像，对被共产党纵容泛滥的腐败和贫富差距问题，深为不满和愤怒，对食物中的毒素，空气中令人窒息的烟尘和水供应中的死猪，感到厌烦。网络和手机为在全国范围内传播新闻和愤怒提供了工具。共产党必须想尽办法，确保这些零碎的不满不联合成协调一致的运动。它有许多“锤子”和“钉子”，但是要想把“果冻”钉在墙上，仍然是困难的。
The other reason for expecting change is that Mr Xi and his colleagues profe to know all this and to be serious about political reform.It has been a recurrent theme at the annual seion of the National People’s Congre (NPC), China’s Potemkin parliament, under way this week.
期待变化的另一个理由是习先生和他的同事们都自称对这些情况很了解，而且要在政治改革上动真格。政治改革一直是人民代表大会上反复出现的主题。人民代表大会是中国波特金式（表面文章和弄虚作假的代号）的国会，本周正在举行。
What looks like a serious purge on conspicuous consumption by freeloading officials suggests the party begins to get it.The “streamlining” of government by merging ministries shows a new willingne to take on powerful vested interests.Mr Xi has urged the party to be brave in tackling reform: “like gnawing at a hard bone and wading through a dangerous shoal” (chewing gum while walking is for wimps). 共产党对爱揩油官员奢侈性消费的严肃整顿，暗示其要开始政治改革行动。通过部门合并来“精简”机构，表明了政府要与强大的既得利益集团进行较量的意愿。习先生要求共产党要勇敢的面对改革问题：“敢于啃硬骨头，涉险滩”（边走路边嚼口香糖，那是胆小鬼做的事）。
Reform, however, does not mean tampering with one-party rule.Rather, as Fu Ying, spokeswoman for the NPC, put it: political reform is “the self-improvement and development of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics”.Put another way, it is about strengthening party rule, not diluting it.Mr Xi seems to agree.A New York-based website, Beijing Spring, has published extracts of a speech he made on a tour of southern China late last year.He affirmed his belief in “the realisation of Communism”.
尽管如此，改革并不意味着要改变一党统治。恰恰相反，正如人民代表大会新闻发言人傅莹所说“政治改革是：“中国特色社会主义的自我完善和发展”。换句话说，政治改革是要加强党的统治，而不是消弱党的统治。看上去，习先生也同意这种观点。纽约一家网站“北京之春”登载了去年底习近平在中国南方考察中一次演讲的节选。他表明了“实现共产主义”的信念。 Democracy in China 中国的民主
Mr Xi also spelled out the leon his party should draw from the failure of its Soviet counterpart: “we have to strengthen the grip of the party on the military.” He is right to pinpoint the willingne or not of the army to shoot people as the crucial difference between the Chinese and Soviet experiences.It is hard to think of a sobriquet Mr Xi would find more insulting than “China’s Gorbachev”.From where he sits, the career of Mikhail Gorbachev is an object leon in failure.
习先生也清楚地讲明了中国共产党应该从苏联共产党的失败中吸取的教训：“我们必须加强党对军队的控制。”清楚地指出军队是否愿意对人民开枪是中国和苏联经验的关键区别，在这一点上他是对的。很难想到有比“中国的戈尔巴乔夫”更让习先生感到受辱的绰号了。从他的立场看，戈尔巴乔夫的生涯是一个失败的教训。
There is a vogue in Chinese intellectual circles for reading Alexis de Tocqueville’s1856 book on the French Revolution, “The Old Regime and the Revolution”.The argument that most resonates in China is that old regimes fall to revolutions not when they resist change, but when they attempt reform yet dash the raised expectations they have evoked.
在中国知识界，阅读1856年托克维尔写的关于法国大革命的“旧制度与大革命”是很时尚的事情。书中最能在中国引起共鸣的观点是：旧政权由于革命而倒台，不是在其抗拒变革时，而是当他们试图改革，但却无法满足他们唤起的期待时。
If de Tocqueville was right, Mr Xi faces an impoible dilemma: to survive, the party needs to reform; but reform itself may be the biggest danger.Perhaps he will see more fundamental political change as the solution.But then pigs will no longer rot in rivers.They will fly.
如果托克维尔是对的，那么习先生就得面临一个不可能的两难处境：为了生存，共产党需要改革；但是改革本身可能是最大的风险。可能他将把更根本的政治变化作为解决方法。但是到那时，猪将不再在河里腐烂了。他们将会飞。
