Good evening, my fellow Americans.
Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep
concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts
of the world, the war in Vietnam.
I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division
about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost
confidence in what their Government has told them about
our policy.The American people cannot and should not be
asked to support a policy which involves the overriding
iues of war and peace unle they know the truth about
that policy.
Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the
questions that I know are on the minds of many of you
listening to me.
How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the
first place?
How has this administration changed the policy of the
previous Administration?
What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris
and on the battlefront in Vietnam?
What choices do we have if we are to end the war?
What are the prospects for peace?
Now let me begin by describing the situation I found
when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been
going on for four years.Thirty-one thousand Americans
had been killed in action.The training program for the
South Vietnamese was beyond [behind] schedule.Five
hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam
with no plans to reduce the number.No progre had been
made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States
had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.
The war was causing deep division at home and criticism
from many of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad.
In view of these circumstances, there were some who
urged that I end the war at once by ordering the
immediate withdrawal of all American forces.From a
political standpoint, this would have been a popular and
easy course to follow.After all, we became involved in
the war while my predeceor was in office.I could
blame the defeat, which would be the result of my
action, on him -- and come out as the peacemaker.Some
put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to
avoid allowing Johnson\'s war to become Nixon\'s war.
But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the
years of my Administration, and of the next election.I
had to think of the effect of my decision on the next
generation, and on the future of peace and freedom in
America, and in the world.
Let us all understand that the question before us is not
whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans
are against peace.The question at iue is not whether
Johnson\'s war becomes Nixon\'s war.The great question
is: How can we win America\'s peace?
Well, let us turn now to the fundamental iue: Why and
how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in
the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with
the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet
Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist
government on South Vietnam by instigating and
supporting a revolution.
In response to the request of the Government of South
Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and
military equipment to aist the people of South Vietnam
in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover.Seven
years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military
personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers.Four years ago,
President Johnson sent American combat forces to South
Vietnam.
Now many believe that President Johnson\'s decision to
send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong.
And many others, I among them, have been strongly
critical of the way the war has been conducted.
But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in
the war, what is the best way to end it?
In January I could only conclude that the precipitate
withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam would be
a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United
States and for the cause of peace.
For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal
would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the
maacres which followed their takeover in the North 15
years before.They then murdered more than 50,000 people
and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor
camps.
We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam
when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year.
During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign
of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to
death, and buried in ma graves.
With the sudden collapse of our support, these
atrocities at Hue would become the nightmare of the
entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a
half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when
the Communists took over in the North.
For the United States this first defeat in our nation\'s
history would result in a collapse of confidence in
American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the
world.
Three American Presidents have recognized the great
stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be
done.
In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic
eloquence and clarity said,
\"We want to see a stable Government there,\" carrying on
the [a] struggle to maintain its national independence.\"
We believe strongly in that.We are not going to
withdraw from that effort.In my opinion, for us to
withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only
of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia.So we\'re going to
stay there.\"? President Eisenhower and President Johnson expreed the
same conclusion during their terms of office.
For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would be
a disaster of immense magnitude.A nation cannot remain
great if it betrays its allies and lets down its
friends.Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam
without question would promote recklene in the
councils of those great powers who have not yet
abandoned their goals of worlds conquest.This would
spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain
the peace -- in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually
even in the Western Hemisphere.Ultimately, this would
cost more lives.It would not bring peace.It would
bring more war.
For these reasons I rejected the recommendation that I
should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our
forces.I chose instead to change American policy on
both the negotiating front and the battle front in order
to end the war fought on many fronts.I initiated a
pursuit for peace on many fronts.In a television speech
on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a
number of other occasions, I set forth our peace
proposals in great detail.
We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside
forces within one year.We have proposed a cease fire
under international supervision. We have offered free
elections under international supervision with the
Communists participating in the organization and conduct
of the elections as an organized political force.And
the Saigon government has pledged to accept the result
of the election.
We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.We have indicated that we\'re willing to
discu the proposals that have been put forth by the
other side.We have declared that anything is
negotiable, except the right of the people of South
Vietnam to determine their own future.
At the Paris peace conference Ambaador Lodge has
demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public
meetings.Hanoi has refused even to discu our
proposals.They demand our unconditional acceptance of
their terms which are that we withdraw all American
forces immediately and unconditionally and that we
overthrow the government of South Vietnam as we leave.
We have not limited our peace initiatives to public
forums and public statements.I recognized in January
that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be
settled in a public forum.That is why in addition to
the public statements and negotiations, I have explored
every poible private avenue that might lead to a
settlement.
Tonight, I am taking the unprecedented step of
disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for
peace, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly
because we thought we thereby might open a door which
publicly would be closed.
I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for
peace.Soon after my election, through an individual who
was directly in contact on a personal basis with the
leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for
a rapid, comprehensive settlement.Hanoi\'s replies
called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.
Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military
equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers,
my aistant for national security affairs, Dr.
Kiinger, Ambaador Lodge and I personally have met on
a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet
Government to enlist their aistance in getting
meaningful negotiations started.In addition, we have
had extended discuions directed toward that same end
with representatives of other governments which have
diplomatic relations with North Vietnam.
None of these initiatives have to date produced results.
In mid-July I became convinced that it was neceary to
make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris
talks.I spoke directly in this office, where I?m now
sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on
a personal basis for 25 years.Through him I sent a
letter to Ho Chi Minh.I did this outside of the usual
diplomatic channels with the hope that with the
neceity of making statements for propaganda removed,
there might be constructive progre toward bringing the
war to an end.
Let me read from that letter to you now:
Dear Mr.President:
I realize that it is difficult to communicate
meaningfully acro the gulf of four years of war.But
precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this
opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to
work for a just peace.I deeply believe that the war in
Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to
an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of
Vietnam.The time has come to move forward at the
conference table toward an early resolution of this
tragic war.You will find us forthcoming and open-minded
in a common effort to bring the bleings of peace to
the brave people of Vietnam.Let history record that at
this critical juncture both sides turned their face
toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.\"
I received Ho Chi Minh\'s reply on August 30, three days
before his death.It simply reiterated the public
position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly
rejected my initiative.The full text of both letters is
being released to the pre.
In addition to the public meetings that I have referred
to, Ambaador Lodge has met with Vietnam\'s chief
negotiator in Paris in 11 private seions.And we have
taken other significant initiatives which must remain
secret to keep open some channels of communications
which may still prove to be productive.
But the effect of all the public, private, and secret
negotiations which have been undertaken since the
bombing halt a year ago, and since this Administration
came into office on January 20th, can be summed up in
one sentence: No progre whatever has been made except
agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.
Well, now, who\'s at fault? It\'s become clear that the
obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the
President of the United States.It is not the South
Vietnamese Government.The obstacle is the other side\'s
absolute refusal to show the least willingne to join
us in seeking a just peace.And it will not do so while
it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our
next conceion, and our next conceion after that one,
until it gets everything it wants.
There can now be no longer any question that progre in
negotiation depends only on Hanoi \'s deciding to
negotiate -- to negotiate seriously.I realize that this
report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is
discouraging to the American people, but the American
people are entitled to know the truth -- the bad news as
well as the good news -- where the lives of our young
men are involved.
Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report
on another front.At the time we launched our search for
peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an
end to the war through negotiations.I therefore put
into effect another plan to bring peace -- a plan which
will bring the war to an end regardle of what happens
on the negotiating front.It is in line with the major
shift in U.S.foreign policy which I described in my
pre conference at Guam on July 25.Let me briefly
explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine --
a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam
but which is an eential element of our program to
prevent future Vietnams.
We Americans are a do-it-yourself people -- we\'re an
impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to
do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait
has been carried over into our foreign policy.In Korea,
and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most
of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to
help the people of those countries defend their freedom
against Communist aggreion.
Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a
leader of another Asian country expreed this opinion
to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen.
He said: ?When you are trying to aist another nation
defend its freedom, U.S.policy should be to help them
fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.? Well in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down
in Guam three principles as guidelines for future
American policy toward Asia.First, the United States
will keep all of its treaty commitments.Second, we
shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the
freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose
survival we consider vital to our security.Third, in
cases involving other types of aggreion we shall
furnish military and economic aistance when requested
in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall
look to the nation directly threatened to aume the
primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its
defense.
After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders
of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea,
other nations which might be threatened by Communist
aggreion, welcomed this new direction in American
foreign policy.
The defense of freedom is everybody\'s busine -- not
just America\'s busine. And it is particularly the
responsibility of the people whose freedom is
threatened.In the previous Administration, we
Americanized the war in Vietnam.In this Administration,
we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.
The policy of the previous Administration not only
resulted in our auming the primary responsibility for
fighting the war, but even more significant did not
adequately stre the goal of strengthening the South
Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we
left.
The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary
Laird\'s visit to Vietnam in March.Under the plan, I
ordered first a substantial increase in the training and
equipment of South Vietnamese forces.In July, on my
visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams\'s orders, so
that they were consistent with the objectives of our new
policies.Under the new orders, the primary miion of
our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to
aume the full responsibility for the security of South
Vietnam.Our air operations have been reduced by over 20
per cent.
And now we have begun to see the results of this long-
overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.After five
years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally
bringing American men home.By December 15 over 60,000
men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam,
including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.The
South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength.As
a result, they\'ve been able to take over combat
responsibilities from our American troops.
Two other significant developments have occurred since
this Administration took office.Enemy infiltration,
infiltration which is eential if they are to launch a
major attack over the last three months, is le than 20
percent of what it was over the same period last year.
And most important, United States casualties have
declined during the last two months to the lowest point
in three years.
Let me now turn to our program for the future.We have
adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation
with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of
all U.S.combat ground forces and their replacement by
South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled
timetable.This withdrawal will be made from strength
and not from weakne.As South Vietnamese forces become
stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become
greater.
I have not, and do not, intend to announce the timetable
for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this
decision which I?m sure you will understand.As I?ve
indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal
will depend on developments on three fronts. One of
these is the progre which can be, or might be, made in
the Paris talks.An announcement of a fixed timetable
for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive
for the enemy to negotiate an agreement.They would
simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move
in.
The other two factors on which we will base our
withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and
the progre of the training programs of the South
Vietnamese forces.And I am glad to be able to report
tonight progre on both of these fronts has been
greater than we anticipated when we started the program
in June for withdrawal.As a result, our timetable for
withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our
first estimates in June.
Now this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be
frozen in on a fixed timetable.We must retain the
flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the
situation as it is at that time, rather than on
estimates that are no longer valid.Along with this
optimistic estimate, I must in all candor leave one note
of caution.If the level of enemy activity significantly
increases, we might have to adjust our timetable
accordingly.
However, I want the record to be completely clear on one
point.At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago
there was some confusion as to whether there was an
understanding on the part of the enemy that if we
stopped the bombing of North Vietnam, they would stop
the shelling of cities in South Vietnam.
I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on
the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal
program. We have noted the reduced level of
infiltration, the reduction of our casualties and are
basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those
factors.If the level of infiltration or our casualties
increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting,
it will be the result of a conscious decision by the
enemy.Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to
aume that an increase in violence will be to its
advantage.
If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes
our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to
take strong and effective measures to deal with that
situation.This is not a threat.This is a statement of
policy which as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces I
am making and meeting my responsibility for the
protection of American fighting men wherever they may
be.
My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from
what I have said that we really only have two choices
open to us if we want to end this war.I can order an
immediate precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from
Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.Or
we can persist in our search for a just peace through a
negotiated settlement, if poible, or through continued
implementation of our plan for Vietnamization, if
neceary -- a plan in which we will withdraw all of our
forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our
program as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to
defend their own freedom.
I have chosen this second course.It is not the easy
way.It is the right way.It is a plan which will end
the war and serve the cause of peace, not just in
Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.
In speaking of the consequences of a precipitous
withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose
confidence in America.Far more dangerous, we would lose
confidence in ourselves.Oh, the immediate reaction
would be a sense of relief that our men were coming
home.But as we saw the consequences of what we had
done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination
would scar our spirit as a people.
We have faced other crises in our history and we have
become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking
the right way in meeting our challenges.Our greatne
as a nation has been our capacity to do what has to be
done when we knew our course was right.I recognize that
some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for
peace I have chosen.Honest and patriotic Americans have
reached different conclusions as to how peace should be
achieved.In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw
demonstrators carrying signs reading, ?Lose in Vietnam,
bring the boys home.?Well, one of the strengths of our
free society is that any American has a right to reach
that conclusion and to advocate that point of view.
But as President of the United States, I would be untrue
to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this
nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that
point of view and who try to impose it on the nation by
mounting demonstrations in the street.For almost 200
years, the policy of this nation has been made under our
Constitution by those leaders in the Congre and the
White House elected by all the people.If a vocal
minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over
reason and the will of the majority, this nation has no
future as a free society.
And now, I would like to addre a word, if I may, to
the young people of this nation who are particularly
concerned, and I understand why they are concerned,
about this war.I respect your idealism.I share your
concern for peace.I want peace as much as you do.There
are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war.
This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers,
fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given
their lives for America in Vietnam.It\'s very little
satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many
letters as I signed the first week in office. There is
nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do
not have to write any of those letters.
I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave
young men in Vietnam.But I want to end it in a way
which will increase the chance that their younger
brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some
future Vietnam some place in the world.
And I want to end the war for another reason.I want to
end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our
young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred
against those responsible for the war, can be turned to
the great challenges of peace, a better life for all
Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.
I have chosen a plan for peace.I believe it will
succeed.If it does not succeed, what the critics say
now won?t matter.Or if it does succeed, what the
critics say now won?t matter.If it does not succeed,
anything I say then won?t matter.
I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism
or national destiny these days, but I feel it is
appropriate to do so on this occasion.Two hundred years
ago this nation was weak and poor.But even then,
America was the hope of millions in the world.Today we
have become the strongest and richest nation in the
world, and the wheel of destiny has turned so that any
hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom
will be determined by whether the American people have
the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge
of free-world leadership.
Let historians not record that, when America was the
most powerful nation in the world, we paed on the
other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for
peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated
by the forces of totalitarianism.
So tonight, to you, the great silent majority of my
fellow Americans, I ask for your support.I pledged in
my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way
that we could win the peace.I have initiated a plan of
action which will enable me to keep that pledge.The
more support I can have from the American people, the
sooner that pledge can be redeemed.For the more divided
we are at home, the le likely the enemy is to
negotiate at Paris.
Let us be united for peace.Let us also be united
against defeat.Because let us understand -- North
Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States.
Only Americans can do that.
Fifty years ago, in this room, and at this very desk,
President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the
imagination of a war-weary world.He said: ?This is the
war to end wars.? His dream for peace after World War I
was shattered on the hard reality of great power
politics.And Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.
Tonight, I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is
the war to end wars, but I do say this: I have initiated
a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring
us closer to that great goal to which -- to which
Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our
history has been dedicated -- the goal of a just and
lasting peace.
As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the
best path for that goal and then leading the nation
along it.
I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this
responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can
command, in accordance with your hopes, mindful of your
concerns, sustained by your prayers.
Thank you and good night.
名人演讲：尼克松：沉默的大多数 The Great Silent[推荐]
英语演讲稿：The Great Silent Majority
英语演讲稿：The Great Silent Majority
英语演讲："The Great Silent Majority"
