ZHEJIANG SHUREN UNIVERSITY
《学科前沿文献读写议》课程作业
学生姓名： 沈焱强 学
号： 201001013335 专
业： 工商管理 班
级： 工本103班
浙江树人大学管理学院
毕业论文题目：浙江农村养老保险调查分析 外文文献翻译
重新引入代际均衡：波兰养老保险制度
马立克：GóRA 威廉戴维森学院工作论文574号 2003年6月
摘要：波兰于1999年通过了新的养老金制度。这种新的养老保险制度允许波兰，以减少退休金支出（占GDP的百分比），而不是增加它 -正如预计的经合组织其他大多数国家。本文介绍了概念背景的新系统的设计。新系统的长期目的是确保人口代际平衡，不论情况。这需要稳定的国内生产总值的份额分配给整个退休一代。传统的养老金制度的目的，相反，在稳定的份额人均国内生产总值退休人员。在人口结构的变化观察到，在过去的一夫妻几十年，这历史性的尝试，以稳定为首占GDP的比重为退休人员严重的财政问题和经济增长负外部性，如观察许多国家。许多国家曾试图改革其养老金制度不同的方法来尝试解决这些不断增加的费用问题。虽然波兰改革采用了其他地方应用技术，它的设计不同于典型的做法和教训，结果是有希望的所有经合组织国家。本文介绍了这一理论和实际应用另一种方法，因此，新的波兰养老保险制度主要特点设计。
导言
人口结构的转型与政策过于短视一起造成了严重的问题在全世界许多国家地区的养老金。传统的要素养老金制度的设计包括对捐款的薄弱环节和利益缺乏超过该系统的成本控制。这些因素列入养老保险制度导致爆炸的设计成本，造成了负增长的外部因素和导致失业率持续高企。因此，养老金改革的追求现已在世界各地，特别是在欧洲的政策议程的顶部。然而，很少有国家能够在引进根本性的改革面积到了这个时候养老金。在这种情况下，改革的定义是至关重要的。对于本文的目的，“改革”是指改变系统，以消除而不是仅仅在边缘玩的贡献率时下绝大多数平均拥有多年的生活留下来住。 因此，上面的讨论表明，养老保险制度的目标已经改变了养老退休金系统（OA ）的一部分。然而，非养老社会保障制度（ NOA ），如残疾，保持风险有关，不论老化。这将导致社会保障体系的各部分的结论是，应采用分段，如收入（贡献）和费用（利益）可以连接到他们的目的完全随着时间的推移，各分部相互绝缘。
在这种方式中，决策者将能够看到各分部的社会保障体系，知道系统其他部分的风险，其收入和支出都被绝缘的当前状态，准确地反映了该分部的和共同的系统作为一个整体。社会保障体系，然后将一个OA段（养老金）和各的NOA段（残疾，生育，工人的补偿等等） 。这种业务和会计改革是最重要的一个深养老保
险制度改革的非财政的原因之一，并为决策者提供一个功能强大的工具来了解如何以及他们的社会保障体系，将满足其目标。 养老金：所提出的方法的总结
典型的养老金经济学，以及流行的讨论，使用下面的对立概念为思考中心基础养老金：
现付与资金；
公共与私人的；
多方面与多支柱。
本文提出了一种替代方法。这种替代方法，可以在以下四对对立的概念，总结了： 通用（强制覆盖整个人口）和部分（一组人自愿参与）；
个性化（个人账户）与匿名（不）参与；
具体的任务/分段（OA与NOA）与多任务（OA和NOA混合在一个方案）社会保障组织；
金融（通过金融市场回报率）与非财务（通过真正的经济增长产生的回报率）。
有效的养老保险制度的一种方式，使内源性的设计，这意味着它会自动调整不干预外。系统只需要一个决定，即贡献率的初步选择。
基于比较的上面设置养老金的思维方式可以更好地描述和分析了养老保险制度是有用的。这种方法也可以让养老金讨论超越那些促进民办养老基金和那些促进所谓的现收现付制无望的争议。
在欧盟等和其它地方的政策制定者可以使用所提出的方法的时候，看着他们的养老金制度改革。
波兰新的养老保险制度的主要特点
波兰新养老保险制度的设计是一个很好的例子应用上述，介绍了在实践中的思维方式。命名为“安全系统通过多样性“1999年1月开始。它完全取代了以前的条例退休金的工作人口的大多数。设计新系统从从无到有提供了独特的机会，以避免复杂的系统。相反，新系统的设计是简单和透明。主要目标是设计一个系统可以是中性的，或者至少关闭经济增长无论对中立人口老龄化。新系统的设计不复制任何其他现有的养老保险制度在其他地方。很强的相似性，可以发现，只有到新的瑞典养老保险制度根据类似的原则，并开始在同一时间对同一，在这一总体框架波兰新系统采用了数字技术的概念在其他国家发展。这种新波兰养老保险制度的简要介绍对一般的系统经济性设计的重点，同时搁置最技术细节。 下面的子弹协助抓的波兰新概念的本质系统设计。 重点是普遍的养老保险制度的一部分；
分离，社会保障的养老从非养老部分的一部分社会保障和分割的收入流； 终止了以前的系统办公自动化的一部分； 创建一个新的办公自动化系统完全养老金个人账户的基础上； 权责发生制在办公自动化系统； 分裂两个帐户（第一帐户中的每个人的办公自动化捐款北区区议会，第二个帐户）；
最小的两个补充养老年金顶部，如果他们的总和低于一定水平（资金，国家预算中）。
特别是有没有这样的元素作为一个“国家基本养老金”的制度。社会再分配的存在，但它被移动从退休金制度。养老保险制度的唯一的作用是提供一个有效的方法，对收入分配工作的一代人生命周期。对于整个社会保障体系的贡献率并没有改变。不过工人的工资是“票房注册”，以便向他们介绍他们的想法，付出的贡献的一部分，并建造了总成本的意识养老保险制度。因此，自1999年1月工人和雇主分担没有任何费用的捐款在捐款总额的大小真正的变化。该整个操作影响的百分比，但不是真正的金钱流动。因此新的系统是基于以前的系统相同的贡献流入。
结束语
为人们提供与社会保障- 包括消费融资的退休一代一代的产品进行的工作- 是非常高的名单在大多数国家的社会优先事项。这是社会的重要，特别是在欧洲。然而，传统的养老金制度的低效率在实现这一目标的提出风险。社会和民众主义言论向公众表明，改变内养老保险制度是危险的社会目标。在现实中，大多数国家在世界上，它是刚好相反。时间越长，传统的养老金制度是举起，在更多的社会造成的破坏性影响将被创建。波兰属于一个国家的非组，为众多的人准备我们的时间，即人口老龄化最严峻的挑战。新养老保险制度不仅将停止对养老保险制度的成本增加，但会也让他们减少。这将使更多的资源用于发展，这反过来也将有助于更强劲的增长，加双方的工作生活和退休一代的标准。波兰新的养老金制度的例子，以及瑞典之一，有趣的另一个原因。这种类型的系统有利于劳动力的流动，这是特别需要在欧洲。免费的劳工运动，就不可能实现如果从一国转移到另一个影响到退休后的收入预期。因此，在养老保险制度的中立性目标将有越来越多的欧洲重要整合。
外文文献原文
Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key Concepts behind the New Polish Pension System
By: Marek Góra William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 574
June 2003
Abstract Poland adopted a new pension system in 1999.This new pension system allowsPoland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing itas is projected for the majority of other OECD countries.This paper presents theconceptual background of the new system design.The new system’s long-termbjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographicsituation.This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retiredgeneration.Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share ofGDP per retiree.The change in demographic structure observed over the past for acouple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree ledto severe fiscal problems and negative externalities for growth, as observed innumerous countries.Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems indifferent ways to try to resolve the iue of these ever-increasing costs.Although thePolish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs fromthe typical approaches – and the leons and results are promising for all OECDcountries.This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of thisalternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension systemdesign.Introduction Demographic transition together with myopic policies has caused severe problems inthe area of pensions in many countries around the world.Elements of traditionalpension systems’ design include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lackof control over costs of the system.Inclusion of these elements in the pension systemdesign led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for
growth andcontributed to persistently high unemployment.As such, the quest for pension reformis now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe.However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in thearea of pensions to this time.In this case, the definition of reform is crucial.For thepurposes of this paper, “reform” means changing the system in order to removetructural inefficiencies – and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates and retirement ages to adjust the system’s parameters for short-term fiscal andpolitical reasons.Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies withsocial security.At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by alack of consensus on what could replace the traditional system.Discuions on thisiue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discuionparticipants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pay-as-you-go” versus“funding”, or “public” versus “private”, while at the same time ignoring a number ofimportant economic iues.Furthermore, economists have traditionally ignored pensions.Designing and runningpension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concernedwith how to finance pensions in the long-term or with how to counteract these pensionsystems’ negative externalities.The new Polish pension system belongs to very smallnumber of succeful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions.Thisdoes not mean – as some may aume – giving up social security goals.Rather, thekey idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering social security in orderto save its goals and principles.This paper consists of two parts.The first focuses on a discuion of general iuesthat need to be addreed when designing a pension system.These iues arepresented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions.In regards to this second part of the paper, it is important to point out that mostcountries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pensionsystems that are eentially the same at the basic policy level.As such, the solutionsin one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same.Like European states such as France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungaryand other European states, Poland and Sweden over the past decades and until the late1990’s developed inefficient, costly pension systems.As such, in part two of thepaper we shall examine how Poland has now succefully implemented the approachpresented in the first part of the paper, and created a fundamentally strong and neutralpension system. 8
Selected general iues Pension system design has to take into account a number of iues.Their fullpresentation and discuion goes beyond the scope of this paperThis paper presentsonly a list of the iues for consideration and the most important observations.The pension system: externalities versus neutralityThe description of a pension system depends strongly on both the aggregated andindividual viewpoint.From the aggregated perspective, the pension system is a way of dividing currentGDP between a part kept by the working generation and a part allocatedto the retired generation.From the individual perspective, the pension system is a way of income allocationover a person’s life cycle.The above holds irrespective to the technical method applied or the ideologicalviewpoint.The pension system – as defined above – is not necearily pay-as-you-goor funded.Such features stem from technical elements additionally applied on the topof the pension system, rather than from the system itself.If the pension system designaumes anonymous participation and a substantial scale of redistribution then weusually call this system pay-as-you-go.If the pension system design uses financialmarkets, then we usually call it funded.However, these two typically used concepts do not exhaust all poible combinationsof anonymous versus individualised participation and financial versus non-financialpension system design techniques used.The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus fundedapproach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system thatdoes not use financial markets.This approach also neglects the fact that usingfinancial markets means investment (pension portfolio consists of private equities) ordeferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviouslynot the same.Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generatesexternalities.These externalities can be positive and negative.Redistribution withinthe pension system can generate positive externalities if the system is inexpensive,namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large.If theredistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing topersistently high unemployment and weak growth.Using financial markets causespositive externalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money oninvestment.If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead tonegative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more taxdistortions.This can happen if the rate of return on government debt is persistentlyabove the rate of GDP growth.There exists yet another option, namely 9
to bring the pension system as close toeconomic neutrality as poible.This option requires, among other things, combiningindividual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations basedon real economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden.Demographic structure: consequences of the change .Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension systemexchanges a right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the workinggeneration.The exchange can be organised in various ways and also the rights can beexpreed in various ways.In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financialmarkets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on politicalpromise.In all of these cases there is a kind of market for pension rights.The workinggeneration finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retiredgeneration sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the workinggeneration.The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework forthis market.
Given the contribution rate, the demand side of the market is determined by the number of workers and their productivity.The number of retirees determines the demand side.However, if – as it is the case in traditional systems – pensions are administratively defined in terms of wages (replacement rate promised) then the pension system depends solely on the demographic structure.Even strong productivity growth cannot help in balancing the system’s revenue and expenditure.The general change of the demographic structure we see around the world has caused the pyramid scheme used for financing pension expenditure to no longer generate sufficient revenues.In consequence, previous minor inefficiencies have become devastating.Ageing turned the previous “pyramid-shape” demographic structure into a new “hut-shape” one, as illustrated in Figure 1. 10
The pension system strongly depends on the demographic structure of the population.There is no escape from this dependency irrespective of pension system technique used.Using financial markets do not make pension systems immune from this dependency.Financial markets do help, however, in adjusting the system to the current demographic situation by introducing an easy to understand and acceptable link between benefits and contributions paid.The general change of the demographic structure around the world has caused severe fiscal problems for many countries.This change can be seen also from the viewpoint of being able to achieve the traditional social goals of the pension system.In this regard, two important observations are worth mentioning:
In the past, the minority – nowadays the vast majority – of those who pay contributions to the system as workers, afterwards receive benefits as retirees.This means that in the active phase of the individual’s life, participation in the pension system is very similar to long term saving.As the goal is to provide for each individual, using the individual as the main accounting unit becomes a superior way to organize the pension system.
In the past, the pension system channelledGDP to the very old people who were unable to earn a living and finance consumption on their own.Nowadays people who retire are still able to work and earn, and they – on average have many years of life left to live.
As such, the discuion above shows that the objective of the pension system has changed for the old-age part of the pension system (OA).However, the non-old-age parts of social security systems (NOA), such as disability, remain risk related, irrespective to ageing.This leads to the
conclusion that the various parts of the social security system should be segmented, such that revenues (contributions) and expenses (benefits) can be tied to their purpose exclusively over time, and each segment insulated from each other. In this way, policy makers would be able to look at each segment of the social security system, knowing that its revenues and expenses have been insulated from the risks of other parts of the system and are an accurate reflection of the current state of that segment and together of the system as a whole.The social security system, would then be made of an OA segment (pensions) and various NOA segments (disability, maternity, worker’s compensation, and so forth).This operational and accounting reform is one of the most important non-fiscal reasons for a deep pension reform and would provide policy makers with a powerful tool to understand how well their social security system can and will meet its goals.Pensions: Summary of the proposed approach Typically pension economics, as well as popular discuions, use the following opposing concepts as a central basis for thinking on pensions:
Pay-as-you-go versus funding;
Public versus private; Monopillar versus multipillar.This paper presents an alternative approach.This alternative approach can be summarised in the following four pairs of opposing concepts:
Universal (mandatory covering the entire population) versus partial (voluntary participation of a group of people);
Individualised (individual accounts) versus anonymous (no accounts) participation;
Task specific/segmented (OA separated from NOA) versus multitask (OA and NOA mixed within one scheme) organisation of social security;
Financial (generating the rate of return through financial markets) versus nonfinancial (generating the rate of return through real economy growth).
The efficient pension system is designed in a way that makes it endogenous, which means it adjusts automatically without intervening from outside.The system needs only one decision, namely the initial choice of the contribution rate.
The way of thinking on pensions based on the above set of comparisons can be useful for better
describing and analysing the pension system.This approach can also let the discuion on pensions go beyond the hopele controversy of those who promote private funded pension funds and those who promote what is called the pay-as-you-go system.
As such policy makers in the European Union and elsewhere could benefit using the proposed methodology when looking at reforming their pension systems.
Key features of the new Polish pension system The new Polish pension system design is a good example of applying the abovedescribed way of thinking in practice.The system named “Security throughDiversity” started on 1 January 1999.It entirely replaced previous regulations on oldagepensions for majority of working population.Designing the new system fromscratch provided the unique opportunity to avoid complicating the system.Instead, thenew system design is simple and transparent.The main goal was to design a systemthat can be neutral or at least close to neutrality for economic growth irrespective ofpopulation ageing.The design of the new system does not copy any other pension system existingelsewhere.Strong similarity can be found only to the new Swedish pension systembased on similar principles and started on the same day.16 At the same time, withinthis general framework the new Polish system uses a number of technical conceptsdeveloped in other countries.This brief presentation of the new Polish pension systemfocuses on the general economic design of the system, while leaving aside mosttechnical details.The following bullets help in grasping the eence of the concept of the new Polishsystem design.Focusing on the universal part of the pension system; Separation of the old-age part of social security from the non-old-age parts ofsocial security ; and segmenting the flows of revenue; Termination of the part of the previous system; Creation of a new pension system, entirely based on individual accounts; Accrual accounting within the system; Splitting each person’s OA contributions between two accounts (first account – NDC, second account – FDC); Annuitisation of account values at the moment ofretirement; Minimum pension supplement on the top of both annuities if their sum is below certain level (financed out of the state budget).
It should be strongly streed that both accounts are annuitised at the same momentand play exactly the same role within social security.In particular there is no suchelement of the system as a “basic state pension”.Social redistribution exists but it hasbeen moved out from the pension system.The sole role of the pension system isproviding working generation with an efficient method of income allocation over theirlife cycle.The contribution rate for the entire social security system has not changed.Howeverworkers’ salaries were “groed up” in order to introduce to them the idea that theypay part of the contribution and to build their awarene of the overall cost of thepension system.As such, since 1 January 1999 both workers and employers share thecost of contributions without any real change in the size of the total contributions.Thewhole operation affected percentages but not real flows of money.Thus the newsystem is based on the same contribution inflow as the previous system.Final remarks Providing people with social security – including financing consumption of the retiredgeneration out of the product of the working generation - is very high on the list of social priorities in most countries.It is especially important in European societies.However, the inefficiency of traditional pension systems put achieving this goal atrisk.Social and populist rhetoric suggests to the public that changes within thepension system are dangerous for social goals.In reality, for most countries in theworld, it is just the opposite.The longer the traditional pension systems are held up,the more socially damaging effects will be created.Poland belongs to a non-numerous group of countries that are prepared for one of themost difficult challenges of our time, namely the ageing of the population.The newpension system will not only stop the increase of costs of the pension system but willalso allow for their reduction.This will leave more resources available fordevelopment, which, in turn, will contribute to stronger growth and the increase ofliving standards of both the working and the retired generation.The example of the new Polish pension system, as well as the Swedish one, isinteresting for yet another reason.This type of system contributes to labour mobility,which is particularly needed in Europe.Free movement of labour cannot be achievedif moving from one country to another affects expected retirement income.As such,aiming at pension system neutrality will be more and more important for Europeanintegration.
