人民币升值

发布时间：2020-03-02 13:57:00 来源：范文大全收藏本文下载本文手机版

首先，我觉得人民币是应该升值的。

中国改革开放以来的长期顺差，一方面为中国积累了超巨量的外汇储备，从而增强了抵御金融危机的能力，但是，同时也产生了不良的影响：

一、2万亿美元的外汇储备，要么是民族企业辛辛苦苦出口赚来的收入，要么是外资进入中国的投资，这些资金要想在中国大陆流通，必须在中国人民银行转换成人民币，这叫做人民币占款。按照1美元兑换6.84元人民币的比率计算，2万亿美元就需要13.68万亿元人民币发行出来，投入货币流通领域。也就是说，我们每年的国际收支顺差，都在一定程度上转变成我国的通货膨胀。或者说，这些外汇储备虽然在表面上由企业出口赚来的，或者外企投资进来的，但都通过货币发行的渠道以通货膨胀的方式转变成了中国政府的外汇储备了。

二、长期的国际收支顺差所积累起来的超巨量外汇储备，其保值升值成为一个很大的负担。也就是说，我们自己很缺钱的情况下，却把这些钱放在外国去购买人家的股票、债券、国库券，为人家融资。我们的潜在损失是很大的。

三、长期的外贸顺差，说明我们进口不够。我们都知道，钱是为人服务的，钱本身不能直接用来消费和投资。我们超巨量外汇储备只能说明我们牺牲了自己的享受和发展条件。

四、人民币现在面临的升值压力，不仅仅会产生政治、外交方面的摩擦，一个直接的损失就是招致了大量的贸易报复。我们企业辛辛苦苦赚来的钱，最后被别国政府罚没了，成了外国政府的财政收入。

五、我们的政府不断地进行出口退税。这些退税实际上就是对出口商品的财政补贴。那么是谁在享受这些补贴的商品呢？不是我们，是外国居民。也就是说，我们自己缴税，补贴给外国人来低价地享受我们的商品。

其次，人民币汇率升值与否，对于美国人来说没有什么影响。

按照克鲁格曼所说，中国从2003年以来，都在人为地在外汇市场上进行操控，大量地卖出人民币，买进美元。那么，在市场上购买中国政府卖出的人民币的，都是些什么人呢？或者说，为什么有人愿意购买中国政府抛售到市场上的人民币呢？

答案可能是，由于大家预期到人民币被低估，会在将来的某一时间升值，于是，买进人民币来赌其升值，就会得到可观的投机性套利回报。

但是，当这些投机分子们发现，长期地持有人民币，却看不到人民币的升值，他们是否还会继续买进人民币呢？如果市场上没有人愿意再购买人民币的话，中国政府在市场上抛售人民币，卖给谁呢？

因此，单纯地从人民币和美元之间的买卖关系上来做文章，显然是说不通的。表面上似乎颇有道理，实际上却是在混淆视听、煽动人们的政治情绪。

美国的根本问题在于两个方面，一是自己的金融监控和金融体系出了问题，从而从次贷危机开始，导致金融危机、继而是经济危机，很多企业倒闭或重组，失业率增加，人们的收入下降。第二个问题是根本性的，也就是美国人自身的经济不平衡，他们购买了太多别国的廉价消费品，但却不能出口足够的商品和服务来平衡自己的国际收支，从而出现了长期的国际收支逆差。如果美元不是国际储备货币的话，美国的这种长期国际收支逆差是不可能得到维持的。所以，第三个原因就应该归罪于美元的国际储备货币的地位，导致美国人肆无忌惮地过度消费和过度进口。

显然，如果人民币升值并且中国出口到美国的消费品不再具有竞争力，那么，美国人就不消费了吗？当然不！美国人就会转而从其他第三世界国家购买商品。美国的国际收支逆差是不会得到多少改善的。

因此，人民币是否升值的问题，不应该成为两国矛盾的焦点，也不应该拿出来做什么政治文章。当然了，中国的人民币确实是应该升值的。

此外，中国的外汇管制和统一的结售汇制度，使得所有的外汇都集中于中国银行和外汇管理局，所有的外汇都必须转而换成人民币来进入货币流通领域，增加了通货膨胀的压力，使得货币政策在很大程度上受制于人民币占款。如果企业自己可以保留手中的外汇（可以是某一个比例），情况将会是更好的结果了。

Taking On China

By PAUL KRUGMAN

Published: March 14, 2010

The New York Times

To give you a sense of the problem: Widespread complaints that China was manipulating its currency — selling renminbi and buying foreign currencies, so as to keep the renminbi weak and China’s exports artificially competitive — began around 2003.At that point China was adding about $10 billion a month to its reserves, and in 2003 it ran an overall surplus on its current account — a broad measure of the trade balance — of $46 billion.

Today, China is adding more than $30 billion a month to its $2.4 trillion hoard of reserves.The International Monetary Fund expects China to have a 2010 current surplus of more than $450 billion — 10 times the 2003 figure.This is the most distortionary exchange rate policy any major nation has ever followed.

And it’s a policy that seriously damages the rest of the world.Most of the world’s large economies are stuck in a liquidity trap — deeply depreed, but unable to generate a recovery by cutting interest rates because the relevant rates are already near zero.China, by engineering an unwarranted trade surplus, is in effect imposing an anti-stimulus on these economies, which they can’t offset.

So how should we respond? First of all, the U.S.Treasury Department must stop fudging and obfuscating.

Twice a year, by law, Treasury must iue a report identifying nations that “manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” The law’s intent is clear: the report should be a factual determination, not a policy statement.In practice, however, Treasury has been both unwilling to take action on the renminbi and unwilling to do what the law requires, namely explain to Congre why it isn’t taking action.Instead, it has spent the past six or seven years pretending not to see the obvious.

Will the next report, due April 15, continue this tradition? Stay tuned.

If Treasury does find Chinese currency manipulation, then what? Here, we have to get past a common misunderstanding: the view that the Chinese have us over a barrel, because we don’t dare provoke China into dumping its dollar aets.

What you have to ask is, What would happen if China tried to sell a large share of its U.S.aets? Would interest rates soar? Short-term U.S.interest rates wouldn’t change: they’re being kept near zero by the Fed, which won’t raise rates until the unemployment rate comes down.Long-term rates might rise slightly, but they’re mainly determined by market expectations of future short-term rates.Also, the Fed could offset any interest-rate impact of a Chinese pullback by expanding its own purchases of long-term bonds.

It’s true that if China dumped its U.S.aets the value of the dollar would fall against other major currencies, such as the euro.But that would be a good thing for the United States, since it would make our goods more competitive and reduce our trade deficit.On the other hand, it would be a bad thing for China, which would suffer large loes on its dollar holdings.In short, right now America has China over a barrel, not the other way around.

So we have no reason to fear China.But what should we do?

Some still argue that we must reason gently with China, not confront it.But we’ve been reasoning with China for years, as its surplus ballooned, and gotten nowhere: on Sunday Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, declared — absurdly — that his nation’s currency is not undervalued.(The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that the renminbi is undervalued by between 20 and 40 percent.) And Mr.Wen accused other nations of doing what China actually does, seeking to weaken their currencies “just for the purposes of increasing their own exports.”

But if sweet reason won’t work, what’s the alternative? In 1971 the United States dealt with a similar but much le severe problem of foreign undervaluation by imposing a temporary 10 percent surcharge on imports, which was removed a few months later after Germany, Japan and other nations raised the dollar value of their currencies.At this point, it’s hard to see China changing its policies unle faced with the threat of similar action — except that this time the surcharge would have to be much larger, say 25 percent.

I don’t propose this turn to policy hardball lightly.But Chinese currency policy is adding materially to the world’s economic problems at a time when those problems are already very severe.It’s time to take a stand.

中国历年来的国际收支状况（单位：亿美元）

2009上 2008

2007

2006

2005

2004 2003

经常项目

134.46 425.11 371.83 253.27 160.82 68.66 45.87

其中

#货物

118.98 360.68 315.38 217.75 134.19

58.98 44.65