基本术语
一、IEC 61508标准术语
说明：以下术语摘录自功能安全标准IEC61508和国家标准GB/T20438。4。故术语标号也未曾改动。 3.1安全术语 3.1.1 伤害 harm physical injury or damage to the health of people either directly or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment.
由于对财产或环境的破坏而导致的直接或间接地对人体健康的损害或对人身的损伤。 3.1.2 危险 hazard potential source of harm 伤害的潜在根源 3.1.3 危险情况 hazardous situation circumstance in which a person is exposed to hazard(s) 人暴露于危险的环境。 3.1.4
危险事件 hazardous event hazardous situation which results in harm 导致伤害的危险情况。 3.1.
5风险 risk combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm 出现伤害的概率及该伤害严重性的组合。 3.1.6 允许风险 tolerable risk risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society 根据当今社会的水准,在给定的范围内能够接受的风险。 3.1.7 残余风险 residual risk risk remaining after protective measures have been taken 采取防护措施以后仍存在的风险。 3.1.8 安全 safety
freedom from unacceptable risk 不存在不可接受的风险。 3.1.9 功能安全 functional safety
part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system which depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities
与EUC和EUC控制系统有关的整体安全的组成部分，它取决于E/E/PE安全相关系统，其它技术安全相关系统和外部风险降低设施功能的正确行使。 3.1.10 安全状态 safe state State of the EUC when safety is achieved 达到安全时EUC的状态。 3.1.11
合理的可预见的误用 reasonable foreseeable misuse
Use of a product, proce or service under conditions or for purposes not intended by the supplier, but which can happen, induced by the product, proce or service in combination with, or as a result of, common human behaviour
由于产品、过程或服务加上人的行为习惯而导致的，或者作为人的行为习惯的一个结果有可能发生的，未按照供方要求的条件和用途对产品、过程和服务的使用。
3.2 设备和装置 Equipment and devices 3.2.1 功能单元 functional unit
Entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose 能够完成规定目的的软件、硬件或两者相结合的实体。 3.2.2 软件 software
intellectual creation comprising the programs, procedures, data, rules and any aociated documentation pertaining to the operation of a data proceing system 包括程序、规程、数据、规则以及相关的数据处理系统操作文档在内的智能创作。 3.2.3 受控设备 equipment under control(EUC)
equipment, machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, proce, transportation, medical or other activities
用于制造、加工、运输、制药或其它活动的设备、机器、器械或成套装置。 3.2.4 EUC风险 EUC risk
risk arising from the EUC or its interaction with the EUC control system 由EUC或由EUC与EUC控制系统相互作用而产生的风险。 3.2.5 可编程电子（PE） programmable electronic（PE）
可编程电子以计算机技术为基础，可以由硬件、软件及其输入和(或)输出单元构成。 based on computer technology which may be comprised of hardware, software, and of input and/or output units 举例：下列均是可编程电子装置： ——微处理器； ——微控制器； ——可编程控制器；
——专用集成电路（ASIC）； ——可编程逻辑控制器（PLC）；
——其它以计算机为基础的装置（智能传感器、变送器、执行器）。 3.2.6 电气/电子/可编程电子 （E/E/PE）electrical/electronic/programmable electronic Based on electrical(E) and/or electronic(E) and/or programmable electronic (PE) technology 基于电气（E）和/或 电子（E）和/或 可编程电子（PE）的技术。 举例：电气/电子/可编程电子装置包括： ——电－机装置（电气）；
——使用电晶体的非可编程电子装置（电子）； ——以计算机技术为基础的电子装置（可编程电子） 3.2.7 有限可变语言 limited variability language
Software programming language, either textual or graphical, for commercial and industrial programmable electronic controllers with a range of capabilities limited to their application 能力范围局限于应用的，用于工商业可编程电子控制器的，文本的或图形的软件编程语言。
3.3 系统：一般概念 3.3.1 系统 system Set of elements which interact according to a design, where an element of a system can be another system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and may include hardware, software and human interaction 根据设计相互作用的一组元素，可能包括相互作用的硬件、软件和人等。系统中的某一元素也可自成一个另外的系统，称为子系统，子系统可以是控制系统也可以是被控系统。 3.3.2 可编程电子系统 (PES) programmable electronic system(PES)
System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more programmable electronic devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices 基于一个或多个可编程电子装置的控制、防护或监视系统，包括系统中所有的元素，诸如电源、传感器和其它输入装置，数据高速公路和其它通信路径，以及执行器和其它输出装置 3.3.3 电气/电子/可编程电子系统 （E/E/PES）electrical/electronic/programmable electronic system(E/E/PES) System for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more electrical/electronic programmable electronic (E/E/PE) devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.
基于一个或多个电气/电子/可编程电子(E/E/PE)装置的用于控制、防护或监视的系统，包括系统中所有的元素,诸如电源、传感器和其它输入装置，数据高速公路和其它通信途径，以及执行器和其它输出装置 3.3.4 EUC控制系统 EUC control system System which responds to input signals from the proce and/or from an operator and generates output signals causing the EUC to operate in the desired manner
对来自过程和(或)操作者的输入信号起反应，产生能使EUC按要求的方式工作的输出信号的系统。 3.3.5 结构 architecture Specific configuration of hardware and software elements in a system 在一个系统中硬件和软件元素的特定配置。 3.3.6 模块 module Routine, discrete component or a functional set of encapsulated routines or discrete components belonging together 程序、分立部件、封装程序的一个功能集、或一组归并在一起的分立部件。 3.3.7 软件模块 software module Construct that consists of procedures and/or data declarations and that can also interact with other such constructs
由规程和（或）数据说明组成的构造，并能与其它这样的构造相互作用。 3.3.8 通道 channel Element or group of elements that independently perform(s) a function 独立执行一个功能的一个或一组元素 3.3.9 多样性 diversity different means of performing a required function 执行一个要求功能的不同方法。 3.3.10 冗余 redundancy means, in addition to the means which would be sufficient, for a functional unit to perform a required function or for data to represent information
对于执行一个要求功能的功能单元或对于表示信息的数据而言，除了够用之外还有多余。 3.4 系统：安全方面 3.4.1 安全相关系统 safety-related system designated system that both:
implements the required safety functions neceary to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC; and — is intended to achieve, on its own or with other E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems or external risk reduction facilities, the neceary safety integrity for the required safety functions 所指的系统：
——必需要能实现要求的安全功能以达到或保持EUC的安全状态；并且
——自身或与其它E/E/PE安全相关系统、其它技术安全相关系统或外部风险降低设施一道,能够达到要求的安全功能所需的安全完整性。 3.4.2 其它技术安全相关系统 other technology safety-related system safety-related system based on a technology other than electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 基于电气/电子/可编程电子技术之外的安全相关系统。 3.4.3 外部风险降低设施 external risk reduction facility
measure to reduce or mitigate the risks which are separate and distinct from, and do not use, E/E/PE safety-related systems or other technology safety-related systems 不使用E/E/PE安全相关系统或其它技术安全相关系统，且与上述系统分开并不同的降低或减轻风险的手段。 3.4.4 简单E/E/PE安全相关系统 low complexity E/E/PE safety-related system — the failure modes of each individual component are well defined; and
— the behaviour of the system under fault conditions can be completely determined 一种E/E/PE安全相关系统 其中：
——已很好确定了每个单独部件的失效模式； ——能完全确定在故障状况下系统的行为。 3.4.5 逻辑系统 logic system Portion of a system that performs the function logic but excludes the sensors and final elements 系统的一部分，用于执行功能逻辑，但不包括传感器和最终元件。 3.5 安全功能和安全完整性 3.5.1 安全功能 Safety function function to be implemented by an E/E/PE safety-related system, other technology safety-related system or external risk reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC, in respect of a specific hazardous event 针对特定的危险事件，为达到或保持EUC的安全状态，由E/E/PE安全相关系统、其它技术安全相关系统或外部风险降低设施实现的功能 3.5.2 安全完整性 safety integrity probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time
在规定的条件下、规定的时间内，安全相关系统成功实现所要求的安全功能的概率。 3.5.3 软件安全完整性 software safety integrity measure that signifies the likelihood of software in a programmable electronic system achieving its safety functions under all stated conditions within a stated period of time 在所有规定条件下和规定时间内表示软件在可编程电子系统中执行其安全功能的可能性的量值。 3.5.4 系统安全完整性 systematic safety integrity part of the safety integrity of safety-related systems relating to systematic failures in a dangerous mode of failure 在危险失效模式中与系统失效有关的安全相关系统安全完整性的一部分 3.5.5 硬件安全完整性（hardware safety integrity）
part of the safety integrity of the safety related systems relating to random hardware failures in a dangerous mode of failure
在危险失效模式中与随机硬件失效有关的安全相关系统安全完整性的一部分。 3.5.6 安全完整性等级（SIL） safety integrity level（SIL）
discrete level (one out of a poible four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest
一种离散的等级（四种可能等级之一），用于规定分配给E/E/PE安全相关系统的安全功能的安全完整性要求，在这里，安全完整性等级4是最高的，安全完整性等级1是最低的。 3.5.7 软件安全完整性等级 software safety integrity level discrete level (one out of a poible four) for specifying the safety integrity of software in a safety-related system 一种离散的等级（四种可能等级之一）用于规定在安全相关系统中软件的安全完整性。 3.5.8 安全要求规范 safety requirement specification
specification containing all the requirements of the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems 一种技术规定，包括安全相关系统必须要执行安全功能的所有要求。 3.5.9 安全功能要求规范 safety function requirement specification
specification containing the requirements for the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems 一种技术规定，包括安全相关系统必须要执行的安全功能要求。 3.5.10 安全完整性要求规范 safety integrity requirement specification
specification containing the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems 一种技术规定，包括安全相关系统必须要执行的安全功能的安全完整性要求。 3.5.11 安全相关软件 safety-related software software that is used to implement safety functions in a safety-related system 在安全相关系统中用于实现安全功能的软件。 3.5.12 操作模式 mode of operation Way in which a safety-related system is intended to be used, with respect to the frequency of demands made upon it, which may be either
-low demand mode: where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof-test frequency -high demand or continuous mode: where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is greater than one per year or greater than twice the proof-check frequency ——低要求模式：在这种模式下，对一个安全相关系统提出操作要求的频率不大于每年一次和不大于二倍的检验测试频率。
——高要求或连续模式：在这种模式下，对一个安全相关系统提出操作要求的频率大于每年一次或大于二倍的检验测试频率。 3.5.13 目标失效量 target failure measure Intended probability of dangerous mode failures to be achieved in respect of the safety integrity requirements, specified in terms of either -the average probability of failure to perform the design function on demand (for a low demand mode of operation) -the probability of a dangerous failure per hour (for a high demand or continuous mode of operation) 相对于安全完整性要求要达到预计的危险模式失效概率，规定为下列两种之一： ——按要求执行设计功能的平均失效概率（对于低要求操作模式）； ——每小时危险失效的概率（对于高要求或连续操作模式）； 3.5.14 必要的风险降低 neceary risk reduction risk reduction to be achieved by the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities in order to ensure that the tolerable risk is not exceeded
为保证不超过允许风险，由E/E/PE安全相关系统、其它技术安全相关系统和外部风险降低设施达到的风险降低。 3.6 故障、失效和错误 3.6.1 故障 fault 使功能单元执行要求之功能的能力降低或失去其能力的异常状况。
abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or lo of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function 3.6.2 故障避免 fault avoidance using techniques and procedures which aim to avoid the introduction of faults during any phase of the safety lifecycle of the safety-related system 在安全相关系统安全生命周期的任何阶段中为避免发生故障而使用的技术和规程。 3.6.3 故障裕度 fault tolerance the ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors
在出现故障或错误的情况下，功能单元继续执行一个要求功能的能力。 3.6.4 失效 failure the termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function 功能单元执行一个要求功能之能力的终止。 3.6.5 随机硬件失效 random hardware failure
failure, occurring at a random time, which results from one or more of the poible degradation mechanisms in the hardware
在硬件中，由一种或几种机能退化可能产生的，按随机时间出现的失效。 3.6.6 系统失效 Systematic failure failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing proce, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors
原因确定的失效，只有对设计或制造过程、操作规程、文档或其它相关因素进行修改后，才有可能排除这种失效。 3.6.7 危险失效 dangerous failure failure which has the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 使安全相关系统处于潜在的危险或丧失功能状态的失效。 3.6.8 安全失效 safe failure failure which does not have the potential to put the safety-related system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 不可能使安全相关系统处于潜在的危险或丧失功能状态的失效。 3.6.9 相关失效 dependent failure failure whose probability cannot be expreed as the simple product of the unconditional probabilities of the individual events which caused it 其概率不能表示为引起它的独立事件的无条件概率的简单乘积的失效。 3.6.10 共同原因失效 common cause failure failure, which is the result of one or more events, causing coincident failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure 一种失效，它是一个或多个事件导致的结果，在多通道系统中引起两个或多个分离通道同时失效，从而导致系统失效。 3.6.11 错误 error discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition
计算、观测和测量到的值或条件与真值、规定的或理论上的正确值或条件的差异。 3.6.12 人为错误 human error 失误mistake human action or inaction that produces an unintended result 引发非期望结果的人的动作或不动作 3.7 生命周期活动 3.7.1 安全生命周期 safety lifecycle neceary activities involved in the implementation of safety-related systems, occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities are no longer available for use 安全相关系统实现过程中所必需的生命活动，这些活动发生在从一项工程的概念阶段开始，直至所有的E/E/PE安全相关系统，其它技术安全相关系统，以及外部风险降低设施停止使用为止的一段时间内。 3.7.2 软件生命周期 software lifecycle activities occurring during a period of time that starts when software is conceived and ends when the software is permanently disused 从软件开始构思到软件永久停用期间的活动。 3.7.3 配置管理 configuration management discipline of identifying the components of an evolving system for the purposes of controlling changes to those components and maintaining continuity and traceability throughout the lifecycle 为了控制系统部件的改变和在生命周期全过程中保持连续性和可追溯性，标记一个进化中的系统部件的规则。 3.7.4 影响分析 impact analysis activity of determining the effect that a change to a function or component in a system will have to other functions or components in that system as well as to other systems 确定一个系统中的一个功能或部件的改变将对该系统中其它功能或部件以及其它系统产生影响的活动。 3.8 安全量的证实 3.8.1 验证 verification confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the requirements have been fulfilled 通过检查和提供客观证据证实规定要求已经满足。 3.8.2 确认 validation confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled
通过检查和提供客观证据来证明某一特定预期用途的特殊要求已经满足。 3.8.3 功能安全评估 functional safety aement
investigation, based on evidence, to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems or external risk reduction facilities 通过调查，依据证据来判断一个或多个E/E/PE安全相关系统、其它技术安全相关系统或外部风险降低设施达到的功能安全。 3.8.4 功能安全审核 functional safety audit systematic and independent examination to determine whether the procedures specific to the functional safety requirements comply with the planned arrangements, are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve the specified objectives 对于按计划安排的功能安全要求专用的规范是否有效地执行并满意地达到规定目的进行系统地、独立的检查。 3.8.5 检验测试 proof test periodic test performed to detect failures in a safety-related system so that, if neceary, the system can be restored to an “as new” condition or as close as practical to this condition 用以检测安全相关系统失效的周期性测试，在必要时可把系统复原到正常状态或实际上接近正常的状态。 3.8.6 诊断覆盖率 diagnostic coverage
fractional decrease in the probability of dangerous hardware failure resulting from the operation of the automatic diagnostic tests
进行自动诊断测试而导致的硬件危险失效概率的降低部分。 3.8.7 诊断测试间隔 diagnostic test interval
interval between on-line tests to detect faults in a safety-related system that have a specified diagnostic coverage
在一个已经规定了诊断覆盖的安全相关系统中，为检测故障而进行的在线测试的间隔。 3.8.8 检测到的 detected Detected revealed overt
in relation to hardware, detected by the diagnostic tests, proof tests, operator intervention (for example physical inspection and manual tests), or through normal operation 揭露出的 明显的
与硬件相关，用诊断测试、检验测试、操作员干预（如设备检测和人工测试）或通过正常操作所发现的。 3.8.9 未检测到的 undetected 未揭露的 unrevealed 不明显的 covert in relation to hardware, undetected by the diagnostic tests, proof tests, operator intervention (for example physical inspection and manual tests), or through normal operation 与硬件有关，用诊断测试、检验测试、操作员干预（如设备检测和人工测试）或通过正常操作未发现的。 3.8.10 无关人员 independent person Person who is separate and distinct from the activities which take place during the specific phase of the overall, E/E/PES or software safety lifecycle that is subject to the functional safety aement or validation, and does not have responsibility for those activities 与整体的、E/E/PES的或软件的安全生命周期特定阶段中的活动无关，并且不对其直接负责，但又从事功能安全评估或确认的人。 3.8.11 无关部门 independent department Department which is separate and distinct from the department responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the overall, E/E/PES or software safety lifecycle that is subject to the functional safety aement or validation 与整体的、E/E/PES的或软件的安全生命周期特定阶段中的活动无关，并且不对其直接负责，但又从事功能安全评估或确认的部门。 3.8.12 无关组织 independent organization
Organization which is separate and distinct, by management and other resources, from the organizations responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the overall, E/E/PES or software safety lifecycle that is subject to the functional safety aement or vaildation 与整体的、E/E/PES的或软件的安全生命周期特定阶段中的活动无关，并且不对其直接负责，但又从事功能安全评估或确认的组织。 3.8.13 动画 animation Simulated operation of the software system (or of some significant portion of the system) to display significant aspects of the behaviour of the system, for instance applied to a requirements specification in an appropriate format or an appropriate high-level representation of the system design 软件系统（或系统的某一重要部分）的动画，以显示系统行为的主要面貌，例如适用于适当格式的要求规范或系统设计的高级表述。 3.8.14 动态测试 dynamic testing Executing software and/or operating hardware in a controlled and systematic way, so as to demonstrate the presence of the required behaviour and the absence of unwanted behaviour 用系统的和受控的方式执行软件和（或）操作硬件以证明所要求的行为的存在以及非要求行为的不存在。 3.8.15 测试装置 test harne Facility that is capable of simulating (to some useful degree) the operating environment of software or hardware under development, by applying test cases to the software and recording the response 在开发阶段能够仿真软件或硬件操作环境的装置。通过把测试实例应用于软件，能够模拟(达到某个可用的程度)开发中的软件或硬件的操作环境并记录响应的设施。
二、IEC61511标准术语
说明：以下术语摘录自IEC61511标准和相关的标准翻译稿，其中有一些术语在前面出现过，但表述略有不同，差别反映了过程控制领域的习惯与特殊性。 3.2.1 结构 architecture Arrangement of hardware and/or software elements in a system, for example (1) arrangement of safety instrumented system (SIS) subsystems (2) internal structure of an SIS subsystem (3) arrangement of software programs 系统中硬件和/或软件元素的安排，如： （1）安全仪表系统（SIS）子系统的安排； （2）SIS子系统的内部结构； （3）软件程序的安排。 3.2.2 资产保护 aet protection Function allocated to system design for the purpose of preventing lo to aets 为防止资产损失分配给系统设计的功能。 3.2.3 基本过程控制系统（BPCS） basic proce control system（BPCS）
System which responds to input signals form the proce, its aociated equipment, other programmable systems and/or an operator and generates output signals causing the proce and its aociated equipment to operate in the desired manner but which does not perform any safety instrumented functions with a claimed SIL≥1
对来自过程的、系统相关设备的、其他可编程系统的和/或某个操作员的输入信号进行响应，并产生使过程和系统相关设备按要求方式运行的系统，但它并不执行任何具有被声明的SIL≥1的仪表安全功能。 3.2.4 通道 channel element or group of elements that independently perform(s) a function 独立执行一个功能的一个或一组元素。 3.2.5 编码 coding 3.2.6.1 共同原因失效 common cause failure failure, which is the result of one or more events, causing failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure
由一个或多个事件引起一个多通道系统中的两个或多个分离通道失效，从而导致系统失效的一种失效。 3.2.6.2 共同模式失效 common mode failure failure of two or more channels in the same way, causing the same erroneous result 两个或多个通道以同样的方式引起相同的误差结果的失效。 3.2.7 部件 component one of the parts of a system, subsystem, or device performing a specific function 执行某一特定功能的系统、子系统或装置的一个组成部分。 3.2.8 配置 configuration 3.2.9 配置管理 configuration management discipline of identifying the components of an evolving (hardware and software) system for the purpose of controlling changes to those components and maintaining continuity and traceability throughout the life cycle
为了在生命周期全过程中控制组件的变化（硬件和软件）和保持连续性和可追溯性，对进化系统（硬件和软件）中组件的识别规则。 3.2.10 控制系统 control system system which responds to input signals from the proce and/or from an operator and generates output signals causing the proce to operate in the desired manner 对来自过程和/或操作员的输入信号进行响应，并产生使过程按要求方式运行的输出信号的系统。 3.2.11 危险失效 dangerous failure failure which has the potential to put the safety instrumented system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 可能使安全仪表系统潜在地处于某种危险或功能丧失状态的失效。 3.2.12 相关失效 dependent failure failure whose probability cannot be expreed as the simple product of the unconditional probabilities of the individual events which caused it 其概率不能表示为引起失效的独立事件的无条件概率的简单乘积的失效。 3.2.13 检测到的 detected 揭露的 revealed 明显的 overt in relation to hardware failures and software faults, detected by the diagnostic tests or through normal operation 在与硬件失效和软件故障有关时，通过诊断测试或正常操作发现的。 3.2.14 装置 device functional unit of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose 能实现某个规定目的的硬件或软件或者二者结合的功能单元 3.2.15 诊断覆盖率（DC） diagnostic coverage (DC) ratio of the detected failure rate to the total failure rate of the component or subsystem as detected by diagnostic tests.Diagnostic coverage does not include any faults detected by proof tests.
诊断测试检测到的部件或子系统的失效率与总失效率之比。诊断覆盖率不包含由检验测试检测到的任何故障。 3.2.16 多样性 diversity existence of different means performing a required function 执行一个要求功能存在不同方法。 3.2.17 电气/电子/可编程电子（E/E/PE）
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
based on electrical (E) and/or electronic (E) and/or programmable electronic (PE) technology 基于电气（E）和/或电子（E）和/或可编程电子（PE）技术。 3.2.18 误差 error discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition 计算出的、观测到的和测量到的值或条件，和真实的、规定的或理论上正确的值或条件之间的差异。 3.2.19 外部风险降低设施 external risk reduction facilities measures to reduce or mitigate the risks, which are separate and distinct from the SIS 与SIS分离且性质不同的降低或减少风险的措施。 3.2.20 失效 failure termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function 功能单元执行一个要求功能的能力的终止。 3.2.21 故障 fault abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or lo of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function
可能引起功能单元执行要求功能的能力降低或丧失的异常状况。 3.2.22 故障避免 fault avoidance use of techniques and procedures which aim to avoid the introduction of faults during any phase of the safety life cycle of the safety instrumented system
在安全仪表系统安全生命周期的任何阶段中为避免引入故障而使用的技术和程序。 3.2.23 故障裕度 fault tolerance ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of faults or errors 在出现故障或误差的情况下，功能单元继续执行要求功能的能力。 3.2.24 最终元件 final element part of a safety instrumented system which implements the physical action neceary to achieve a safe state 执行实现某种安全状态所必需的实际动作的安全仪表系统的组成部分。 3.2.25 功能安全 functional safety part of the overall safety relating to the proce and the BPCS which depends on the correct functioning of the SIS and other protection layers
与过程和BPCS有关的整体安全的组成部分，它取决于SIS和其他保护层的正确功能执行。 3.2.26 功能安全评估 functional safety aement
investigation, based on evidence, to judge the functional safety achieved by one or more protection layers 基于证据的调查，以判定由一个或多个保护层所实现的功能安全。 3.2.27 功能安全审核 functional safety audit systematic and independent examination to determine whether the procedures specific to the functional safety requirements comply with the planned arrangements, are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve the specified objectives 对于按计划安排的功能安全要求专用的规范是否有效地执行并满意地达到规定目的进行系统地、独立的检查。 3.2.28 功能单元 functional unit entity of hardware or software, or both, capable of accomplishing a specified purpose 能够完成规定目的的软件、硬件或两者相结合的实体。 3.2.29 硬件安全完整性 hardware safety integrity part of the safety integrity of the safety instrumented function relating to random hardware failures in a dangerous mode of failure
在危险失效模式中，与硬件随机失效有关的仪表安全功能的安全完整性的一部分。 3.2.30 伤害 harm physical injury or damage to the health of people, either directly or indirectly, as a result of damage to property or to the environment
由财产或环境的破坏而直接或间接导致的人身伤害或人体健康的损害。 3.2.31 危险 hazard potential source of harm 伤害的潜在根源。 3.2.32 人为误差 human error 失误 mistake human action or inaction that produces an unintended result 引发非期望结果的人的动作或不动作。 3.2.33 影响分析 impact analysis activity of determining the effect that a change to a function or component will have to other functions or components in that system as well as to other systems 确定一个系统中的一个功能或部件的改变，对该系统和其他系统中其他功能或部件影响的活动。 3.2.34 独立部门 independent department department which is separate and distinct form the departments responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the safety life cycle that is subject to the functional safety aement or validation
在进行安全评估或确认的安全生命周期的特定阶段中，同负责所发生活动的部门分开且不同的部门。 3.2.35 独立组织 independent organization
organization which is separate and distinct, by management and other resources, from the organizations responsible for the activities which take place during the specific phase of the safety life cycle that is subject to the functional safety aement or validation 在进行安全评估或确认的安全生命周期的特定阶段中，通过管理和其他资源同负责所发生活动的组织分开且不同的组织。 3.2.36 独立人员 independent person person who is separate and distinct from the activities which take place during the specific phase of the safety life cycle that is subject to the functional safety aement or validation and does not have direct responsibility for those activities 在进行安全评估或确认的安全生命周期的特定阶段中，同所发生活动分开且不同的人员，这些人员并不直接负责那些活动。 3.2.37 输入功能 input function function which monitors the proce and its aociated equipment in order to provide input information for the logic solver
为了给逻辑解算器提供输入信息，监视过程及其相关设备的功能。 3.2.38 仪表 instrument apparatus used in performing an action (typically found in instrumented systems) 在执行某个动作中使用的仪器（典型的可见仪表系统）。 3.2.39 逻辑功能 logic function function which performs the transformations between input information (provided by one or more input functions) and output information (used by one or more output functions) ; logic functions provide the transformation from one or more input functions to one or more output functions
在输入信息（由一个或几个输入功能提供）和输出信息（由一个或几个输出功能使用）之间执行变换的功能；逻辑功能提供从一个或几个输入功能到一个或几个输出功能的转换。 3.2.40 逻辑解算器 logic solver that portion of either a BPCS or SIS that performs one or more logic function(s) 既可以是一个BPCS的一部分，也可以是SIS的一部分，它执行一个或几个逻辑功能。 安全配置的逻辑解算器 safety configured logic solver general purpose industrial grade PE logic solver which is specifically configured for use in safety applications in accordance with 11.5 根据11.5为在安全应用中使用专门配置的工业级通用型PE逻辑解算器。 3.2.41 维护/工程接口 maintenance/engineering interface
maintenance/engineering interface is that hardware and software provided to allow proper SIS maintenance or modification.It can include instructions and diagnostics which may be found in software, programming terminals with appropriate communication protocols, diagnostic tools, indicators, bypa devices, test devices, and calibration devices
为能正确维护或修改SIS所提供的硬件和软件。包括：在软件中可能含有的指令和诊断程序、具有适当通信协议的编程终端、诊断工具、指示器、旁路装置、试验装置和校正装置。 3.2.42 减轻 mitigation action that reduces the consequence(s) of a hazardous event 减小危险事件后果的动作。 3.2.43 操作模式 mode of operation way in which a safety instrumented function operates 仪表安全功能运行方式。
要求模式下的仪表安全功能 demand mode safety instrumented function where a specified action (for example, closing of a valve) is taken in response to proce conditions or other demands.In the event of a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented function a potential hazard only occurs in the event of a failure in the proce or the BPCS 响应过程条件或其他要求而采取一个规定动作（如关闭一个阀门）的场合。在仪表安全功能的危险失效事件中，仅当发生过程或BPCS的失效事件时，才发生潜在危险。 连续模式下的仪表安全功能 continuous mode safety instrumented function where in the event of a dangerous failure of the safety instrumented function a potential hazard will occur without further failure unle action is taken to prevent it 在仪表安全功能的危险失效事件中，如果不采取预防动作，即使没有进一步的失效，潜在危险也会发生。 3.2.44 模块 module self-contained aembly of hardware components that performs a specific hardware function (i.e., digital input module, analogue output module), or reusable application program (can be internal to a program or a set of programs) that support a specific function, for example, portion of a computer program that carries out a specific function 执行某个特定硬件功能的硬件部件的自含式组件（即数字输入模块、模拟输出模块），或支持某一特定功能的可重用应用程序（可能是一个或一组内固程序）。如执行特定功能的计算机程序的一部分。 3.2.45 从N中取M MooN safety instrumented system, or part thereof, made up of “N” independent channels, which are so connected, that “M” channels are sufficient to perform the safety instrumented function “N”个独立通道构成的安全仪表系统或其部分，它被连接成其中“M”个通道足以执行仪表安全功能。 3.2.46 必要的风险降低 neceary risk reduction risk reduction required to ensure that the risk is reduced to a tolerable level 为保证把风险降低到允许水平所需的风险降低。 3.2.47 非可编程（NP）系统 non-programmable(NP) system system based on non-computer technologies (i.e., a system not based on programmable electronics [PE] or software) 基于非计算机技术的系统（即不基于可编程电子[PE]或软件的系统）。 3.2.48 操作员接口 operator interface means by which information is communicated between a human operator(s) and the SIS (for example, CRTs, indicating lights, push-buttons, horns, alarms); the operator interface is sometimes referred to as the human-machine interface (HMI) 在操作人员和SIS之间进行信息交换的手段（如阴极射线管CRT、指示灯、按钮、操纵杆、报警器）；操作员接口有时又叫人机接口（HMI）。 3.2.49 其他技术安全相关系统 other technology safety related system safety related systems that are based on a technology other than electrical, electronic, or programmable electronic 不基于电气、电子或可编程电子技术的安全相关系统。 3.2.50 输出功能 output function function which controls the proce and its aociated equipment according to final actuator information from the logic function
根据来自逻辑功能的终端执行机构的信息，控制过程及其相关设备的功能。 3.2.51 阶段 phase period within the safety life cycle where activities described in this standard take place 发生IEC61511中描述活动的安全生命周期中的某个时段。 3.2.52 预防 prevention action that reduces the frequency of occurrence of a hazardous event 降低危险事件发生频率的动作。 3.2.53 以往使用 prior use 3.2.54 过程风险 proce risk risk arising from the proce conditions caused by abnormal events (include BPCS malfunction) 因异常事件（包括BPCS功能失常）引起过程条件产生的风险。 3.2.55 可编程电子（PE） programmable electronics
electronic component or device forming part of a PES and based on computer technology.The term encompaes both hardware and software and input and out units 基于计算机技术构成PES一部分的电子部件或装置。本术语包括硬件和软件及输入和输出单元。 3.2.56 可编程电子系统（PES） programmable electronic system (PES)
system for control, protection or monitoring based on one or more programmable electronic devices, including all elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, actuators and other output devices 基于一个或多个可编程电子装置的，用于控制、防护或监视的系统，包括系统中所有的元素，如电源、传感器和其他输入装置、数据高速公路和其他通信途径、以及执行器和其他输出装置。 3.2.57 编程 programming proce of designing, writing and testing a set of instructions for solving a problem or proceing data 为解决问题或处理数据而设计、编写和测试一组指令的过程。 3.2.58 检验测试 proof test test performed to reveal undetected faults in a safety instrumented system so that, if neceary, the system can be restored to its designed functionality
为揭露安全仪表系统中未检测到的故障而执行的测试，以便在必要时把系统修复到所设计的功能。 3.2.59 保护层 protection layer any independent mechanism that reduces risk by control, prevention or mitigation 借助控制、预防或减轻以降低风险的任何独立机制。 3.2.60 经使用验证的 proven-in-use when a documented aement has shown that there is appropriate evidence, based on the previous use of the component, that the component is suitable for use in a safety instrumented system 当文档化的评估显示有适当证据表明：基于部件以往使用的情况，该部件适用于安全仪表系统时（见11.5中的“以往使用”）。 3.2.61 质量 quality totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy stated and implied needs 一个实体满足指明的和隐含需要的性能总和。 3.2.62 硬件随机失效 random hardware failure
failure, occurring at a random time, which results from a variety of degradation mechanisms in the hardware
在硬件中，由各种退化机制引起，以随机时间发生的失效。 3.2.63 冗余 redundancy use of multiple elements or systems to perform the same function; redundancy can be implemented by identical elements (identical redundancy) or by diverse elements (diverse redundancy) 使用多个元素或系统来执行同一种功能；冗余可以使用同种元素实现（同型冗余），或使用不同元素实现（异型冗余）。 3.2.64 风险 risk combination of the frequency of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm 出现伤害的概率及该伤害严重性的组合。 3.2.65 安全失效 safe failure failure which does not have the potential to put the safety instrumented system in a hazardous or fail-to-function state 不会使安全仪表系统处于潜在的危险状态或功能故障状态的失效。 安全失效分数 safe failure fraction fraction of the overall random hardware failure rate of a device that results in either a safe failure or a detected dangerous failure
导致安全失效或者可检测出的危险失效的装置总硬件随机失效率分数。 3.2.66 安全状态 safe state state of the proce when safety is achieved 达到安全时的过程状态。 3.2.67 安全 safety freedom from unacceptable risk 不存在不可接受的风险。 3.2.68 安全功能 safety function function to be implemented by an SIS, other technology safety related system or external risk, reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the proce, with respect to a specific hazardous event
针对特定的危险事件，为达到或保持过程的安全状态，由SIS、其他技术安全相关系统或外部风险降低设施实现的功能。 3.2.69 仪表安全控制功能 safety instrumented control function
safety instrumented function with a specified SIL operating in continuous mode which is neceary to prevent a hazardous condition from arising and/or to mitigate its consequences 具有某个规定的SIL并运行在连续模式下，以防止发生危险工况和/或减轻其后果所必需的仪表安全功能。 3.2.70 仪表安全控制系统 safety instrumented control system instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented control functions 用来实现一个或几个仪表安全控制功能的仪表系统。 3.2.71 仪表安全功能(SIF) safety instrumented function
safety function with a specified safety integrity level which is neceary to achieve functional safety and which can be either a safety instrumented protection function or a safety instrumented control function
具有某个特定SIL的，用以达到功能安全的安全功能，它既可以是一个仪表安全保护功能，也可以是一个仪表安全控制功能。 3.2.72 安全仪表系统(SIS) safety instrumented system
instrumented system used to implement one or more safety instrumented functions.An SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final elements(s) 用来实现一个或几个仪表安全功能的仪表系统。SIS可以由传感器、逻辑解算器和最终元件的任何组合组成。
3.2.73 安全完整性 safety integrity average probability of a safety instrumented system satisfactorily performing the required safety instrumented functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time
安全仪表系统在规定时段内、在所有规定条件下满意执行要求的仪表安全功能的平均概率。 3.2.74 安全完整性等级(SIL) safety integrity level(SIL)
discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems.Safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity; safety integrity level 1 has the lowest 用来规定分配给安全仪表系统的仪表安全功能的安全完整性要求的离散等级（4个等级中的一个）。SIL 4是安全完整性的最高等级，SIL 1为最低等级。 3.2.75 安全完整性要求规范 safety integrity requirements specification
specification that contains the safety integrity requirements of the safety instrumented functions that have to be performed by the safety instrumented system(s) 包含了安全仪表系统应执行的仪表安全功能的安全完整性要求的规范。 3.2.76 安全生命周期 safety life cycle neceary activities involved in the implementation of safety instrumented function(s) occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the safety instrumented functions are no longer available for use 从项目概念阶段开始到所有的仪表安全功能不再适用时为止所发生的、包含在仪表安全功能实现中的必要活动。 3.2.77 安全手册 safety manual manual which defines how the device, subsystem or system can be safely applied 定义如何安全使用装置、子系统或系统的手册。 3.2.78 安全要求规范 safety requirements specification
specification that contains all the requirements of the safety instrumented functions that have to be performed by the safety instrumented systems 包含安全仪表系统应执行的仪表安全功能的所有要求的规范。 3.2.79 安全软件 safety software software in a safety instrumented system with application, embedded or utility software functionality 在安全仪表系统中具有应用软件功能性、嵌入式软件功能性或工具软件功能性的软件。 3.2.80 传感器 sensor device or combination of devices, which measure the proce condition (for example, transmitters, transducers, proce switches, position switches)
测量过程条件的装置或装置组合（如：变送器、传感器、过程开关和定位开关）。 3.2.81 软件 software intellectual creation comprising the programs, procedures, data, rules and any aociated documentation pertaining to the operation of a data proceing system 包括程序、进程、数据、规则和关于数据处理系统操作的相关文档的智能创作。 固定程序语言（FPL） fixed program language
in this type of language, the user is limited to adjustment of a few parameters (for example, range of the preure transmitter, alarm levels, network addrees) 限定用户只能调整几个参数（如压力变送器的量程、报警等级和网络地址）的语言类型。 有限可变语言（LVL） limited variability language this type of language is designed to be comprehensible to proce sector users, and provides the capability to combine predefined, application specific, library functions to implement the safety requirements specifications.An LVL provides a close functional correspondence with the functions required to achieve the application 被设计成过程领域用户容易理解并可为实现安全要求规范提供组合预定的、应用专用的库功能能力的一种语言类型。LVL可提供一种与达到应用所要求的功能几乎一致的功能。 全可变语言(FVL) full variability language
this type of language is designed to be comprehensible to computer programmers and provides the capability to implement a wide variety of functions and applications 设计成计算机编程者易于理解，并可提供实现各种各样功能和应用的能力的一种语言。 软件程序类型 software program type 应用软件 application software software specific to the user application.In general, it contains logic sequences, permiives, limits and expreions that control the appropriate input, output, calculations, decisions neceary to meet the safety instrumented functional requirements.See fixed and limited variability language
用户应用专用软件。通常，它包含控制正确输入、输出、计算和决策的逻辑时序、允许值、极值和表达式，用以满足仪表安全功能所必须的要求。参见固定程序语言和有限可变语言。 嵌入式软件 embedded software software that is part of the system supplied by the manufacturer and is not acceible for modification by the end-user.Embedded software is also referred to as firmware or system software 作为系统组成部分由制造商提供的软件，最终用户不能对其进行修改。嵌入式软件又叫固件或系统软件。
工具软件 utility software software tools for the creation, modification, and documentation of application programs.These software tools are not required for the operation of the SIS 用来创建、修改和编写应用程序的软件工具。操作SIS并不需要这些软件工具。 3.2.82 软件生命周期 software life cycle activities occurring during a period of time that starts when software is conceived and ends when the software is permanently disused 从开始构思软件到永久性停用软件期间发生的活动。 3.2.83 子系统 subsystem 3.2.84 系统 system set of elements, which interact according to a design; an element of a system can be another system, called a subsystem, which may be a controlling system or a controlled system and may include hardware, software and human interaction
根据设计相互联系的一组元素；系统的一个元素可以是称为子系统的另一系统，该子系统可以是一个主控系统，也可以是一个受控系统，它可能包含硬件、软件和人的交互作用。 3.2.85 系统失效 systematic failure failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the design or of the manufacturing proce, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors
与某种起因以确定性方式有关的失效，只有对设计或制造过程、操作规程、文档或其他相关因素进行修改才能消除这种失效。 3.2.86 系统安全完整性 systematic safety integrity that part of the safety integrity of safety instrumented function relating to systematic failures in a dangerous mode of failure
在失效的危险模式中与系统失效有关的仪表安全功能的安全完整性部分。 3.2.87 目标失效量 target failure measure intended probability of dangerous mode failure to be achieved in respect of the safety integrity requirements, specified in terms of either the average probability of failure to perform the design function on demand (for a demand mode of operation) or the frequency of a dangerous failure to perform the SIF per hour (for a continuous mode of operation) 就安全完整性要求而言，应达到的预计危险模式失效概率，既可规定为要求时执行设计功能的平均失效概率（要求操作模式时），也可规定为每小时执行SIF的危险失效频率（连续操作模式时）。 3.2.88 模板 template 软件模板 software template structured non-specific piece of application software that can be easily altered to support specific functions while retaining the original structure; for example, an interactive screen template controls the proce flow of the application screens, but is not specific to the data being presented; a programmer may take the generic template and make function-specific revisions to produce a new screen for the users 保持原有结构的同时，易于改变以支持特定功能的结构化非专用应用软件段；例如：交互界面模板控制应用界面的过程流，但并非专用于正呈现的数据。程序员可以采用通用模板，并做特定功能修改，从而为用户生成一个新界面。 3.2.89 允许风险 tolerable risk risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society 根据当今社会的水准，在給定范围内能够接受的风险。 3.2.90 未检测到的 undetected 未揭露出的 unrevealed 不明显的 covert in relation to hardware and software faults not found by the diagnostic tests or during normal operation 与硬件和软件有关，未被诊断测试发现的或者在正常操作中未被发现的。 3.2.91 确认 validation activity of demonstrating that the safety instrumented function(s) and safety instrumented system(s) under consideration after installation meets in all respects the safety requirements specification
用以证明被考虑的仪表安全功能和安全仪表系统在安装之后，在各方面都能满足安全要求规范的活动。 3.2.92 验证 verification activity of demonstrating for each phase of the relevant safety life cycle by analysis and/or tests, that, for specific inputs, the outputs meet in all respects the objectives and requirements set for the specific phase
在相关安全生命周期的每个阶段，通过分析和/或测试，证明对于特定的输入，输出应在各方面都能满足为该特定阶段所设置的目标和要求的活动。 3.2.93 看门狗 watchdog combination of diagnostics and an output device (typically a switch) for monitoring the correct operation of the programmable electronic (PE) device and taking action upon detection of an incorrect operation 用来监视可编程电子（PE）装置正确运行，并能在检测到不正确运行时采取动作的诊断装置和输出装置（典型如开关）的组合。
主办单位：机械工业仪器仪表综合技术经济研究所
